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the values, which caused the initial protection of the river.
Additionally, the court stated that the "outstandingly remarkable"
values of a river and its surroundings require consideration to
determine whether to protect a river under the Act.
First, the court acknowledged the Act gives NPS broad discretion
in determining which areas to include as protected areas, but rejected
NPS's argument that the Act failed to provide an absolute standard for
setting boundaries of protected River areas. The court held that the
Act mandated the use of the "outstandingly remarkable" criteria in
determining the River area boundaries.
Second, the court rejected NPS's argument that it did utilize the
"outstandingly remarkable" standard because it considered such
standard synonymous with the "significant and important" criteria.
The court determined the terms "significant and important" were
much broader and included more qualities than the terms
"outstandingly remarkable."NPS argued that any reference to the
"significant and important" standard was corrected in the final
boundary decision and corresponding report. The court rejected the
re-definitions as insufficient because NPS's entire analysis and decision
still rested upon the "significant and important" standard, not the
"outstandingly remarkable" standard required by the Act.
Finally, the court affirmed that NPS was not required to physically
mark the final boundaries of the protected River area. It noted that
the Act simply requires NPS to make available to the public
information regarding such boundaries on maps located in the offices
of the administering agency.
The court reversed and remanded the case with instructions. The
trial court must remand to NPS and NPS must determine River area
boundaries utilizing the "outstandingly remarkable" values standard.
Megan Becher-Harris
NINTH CIRCUIT
Carson Harbor Viii., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act: (1) necessary response costs
are found in the nature of the threat presented by the contamination
and whether the response action addressed the threat, lack of agency
action is not dispositive of whether contamination presents
environmental risk worthy of response, and evidence of ulterior motive
is insignificant; (2) the statutory term "disposal" includes passive
migration of hazardous materials; and (3) the strict liability statute
does not require a causal nexus correlating the costs incurred and an
individual generator's waste).

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. ("Carson Harbor") appealed a district
court grant of summary judgment to Unocal Corporation ("Unocal")
seeking cleanup costs pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Caron Harbor
owned and operated a mobile home park from 1977 to 1983. From
1945 to 1983, Unocal held a leasehold interest in the same property
and used the land for petroleum production. City storm water run-off
feeding into the property through freeway drains contaminated
wetlands covering several acres of the property. In 1993, an
environmental assessment completed by Carson Harbor, revealed slag
and tar-like material in the wetlands area in levels exceeding state
reporting limits. Carson Harbor informed the Regional Water Quality
Control Board ("RWQCB") of the contamination and began clean up
according to a remedial action plan ("RAP") impliedly agreed upon by
RWQCB. Once the site was within established limits, the RWQCB sent
a "no further action letter" to Carson Harbor. Carson Harbor then
sought contribution from previous owners, partnership defendants
("Partnership"), government defendants ("Government"), and
Unocal.
The district court rejected all of Carson Harbor's claims finding
(1) an inadequate showing of "necessary" costs under CERCLA; (2) a
lack of "disposal" of hazardous substances by Partnership under
CERC[A; (3) a complete defense for the Government under common
law claims of nuisance, trespass, and injury to easement; and (4) a
finding of no obligation on the part of Partnership on the claim of
express indemnity under the purchase agreement. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's holding on the CERCLA
claims, as well as the purchase agreement indemnity granted to
Partnership. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of
summary judgment on Carson Harbor's nuisance claim and remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
CERCLA bases "necessary" response costs analysis on the nature of
the threat caused by contamination, the existence of a valid threat to
public health or the environment, and whether the response action
addressed the threat. The court found ulterior motives, such as
enhancing business interests, were not significant to determine
"necessary" response costs. The court further held inaction by the
relevant agency is not dispositive.
In considering the threat, the court found RWQCB's actions
evidenced awareness of an environmental threat requiring remedial
action. RWQCB's Site Clean-up Unit Chief conceded the lead
contamination threatened groundwater and required action. The
court reasoned that because a plaintiff seldom conducts site clean up
without some motive, ulterior motive is insignificant. Further, the
finding of a threat to human health or environment outweighs
relevancy of motive. Finally, the court concluded action necessary and
consistent with the national contingency plan does not first require
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significant state or local government action. The court stated agency
failure to recognize an actionable threat was not conclusive because
agency decisionmakers are constrained by institutional and financial
issues.
The court considered Partnership's cross motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that "disposal" required active migration
and held the statute included passive migration. As directed by
CERCLA, the court based its analysis on the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act's ("RCRA") definition of "disposal." The court
considered RCRA's terms "discharge," "spilling," and "leaking" on
their face, under common law interpretations, and on statutory intent.
The court found the terms had well-recognized passive meanings. The
court held only a strained reading of the language, in the context of
RCRA, required active migration. Finally, the court found active
migration contradicted the intent of CERCLA's broad remedial goals.
Other CERCLA issues decided by the court included the
Government's claim Carson Harbor failed to show a causal nexus
between response costs incurred and contamination. The court
dismissed the claim, finding Congress's deletion of specific statutory
language indicative of intent not to require a causal link.
The court found common law challenges to statutorily authorized
conduct invalid and affirmed summary judgment for the Government
on Carson Harbor's nuisance claims. The Government received
NPDES permits to cover storm run-off. Because the California Civil
Code prevents common law challenges to acts performed under
express authority of a statute, the Government was not liable.
In negating a causation requirement and finding passive migration
in disposal of hazardous materials, the court found the district court's
grant of summary judgment conflicted with the broad-based remedial
intent of the statute.
ChristineEllison
United States v. Hagberg, 207 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
disposers of sewage pumped from septic tanks receiving only domestic
sewage are disposing of sewage sludge from a treatment works treating
domestic sewage within the meaning of and pursuant to regulations of
the Clean Water Act).
In September 1997, Jamie John Hagberg ("Hagberg") pumped
sewage material from the septic tank of the Cozy Corner Bar in Lavina,
Montana, into his H & H Septic and Drain Company pump truck.
Hagberg then discharged the sewage along a 1.6 mile stretch of road.
The government indicted him for "knowingly disposing of domestic
sewage on a public contact site" under sections 1345(e) and
1319(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act. Subsection 1345(e) makes it
"unlawful for any person to dispose of sludge from a publicly owned

